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INTRODUCTION
In his opening brief, appellant carefully set forth
each of the challenged findings and showed that the trial court's
decision to give appellee custody of the parties' three minor
children is not rationally supported by the evidence adduced at
trial.
In response, appellee repeats these unsupported
findings without providing substantive citations to the record to
defend them.

For example, appellant repeats finding 10, that

"[appellant] stated that his work schedule was unpredictable."
Brief of Appellee at p. 6 (citing R. 2952-56, 3029-30, 3346-51,
33 70).

The fourteen pages of citations given by appellee do not

support this statement.

As discussed in Appellant's Brief at

page 18, appellant never said his work schedule was
"unpredictable."

Rather, it was appellee who testified that her

schedule was "very erratic," R. 3428, while appellant testified
that his was totally at his discretion, R. 3009.

The error

illustrated in this finding typifies the other challenged
findings; the Court simply ignored the evidence presented and
abused its discretion in failing to enter findings that were
rationally supported by the evidence.
Appellee also misstates the record, such as by claiming
that Dr. Strassberg admitted the MMPI can be manipulated,
implying that appellant manipulated his MMPI test.
Appellee at p. 7.

Brief of

Dr. Strassberg did say that the test can be

manipulated, but his entire statement reveals an entirely
different focus:
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It's fairly easy to manipulate, but quite
difficult to do and not get caught at it.
The test is, while transparent in some respects, is quite nontransparent in a number
of others. I routinely ... have my graduate
students try to fake on the MMPI or MMPI II,
and not get caught.... [It's] almost impossible for most of them to manage it. It
would take somebody who was quite familiar
with the test, not just that the test exists,
or what some of the items on the test are,
but would have to be quite familiar with the
scoring of it to effectively manipulate such
as to fool an experienced clinician.
R. 3174-75.
There was no evidence that appellant had any
familiarity with the MMPI II, or that he attempted to manipulate
it.

Rather, the evidence was that appellee, consistent with her

dishonest and manipulative personality profile, attempted to
manipulate the test and got caught at it.

Like virtually every

finding, however, the Court accepted, without question, Elizabeth
Stewart's sixteen-month-old decision to reject appellant's normal
psychiatric profile and appellee's disturbed profile in order to
reach a decision completely at odds with the parties' conduct and
history throughout this matter.

This was an abuse of judicial

discretion.
Similarly, appellee suggests, without any substantive
evidence, that the court held "several sidebar conferences" to
advise counsel that defendant "needed to be more under control."
This is simply false.

Such claims should be given no

consideration by the Court, except to the extent they bear on
appellee's credibility.

Appellee points to a single admonishment

by the Court to defendant, after he unconsciously shook his head
in response to a question posed to another physician, and to a
168667
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single incident where appellant was confused by a question posed
by appellee's counsel, in a thinly veiled effort to again call
appellant's stability into question.

Such tactics should not be

condoned by the Court, particularly where there is competent
evidence on the record to refute such accusations.

R. 2736,

2749, 2768 (Dr. Susan Mirow, the psychiatrist who saw appellant
sixteen times, testified that he is emotionally "quite healthy,"
and that he is a thoughtful, interactive parent that is "quite
adept" at reaching other people emotionally).
Appellee also claims that appellant has failed to
marshal the evidence, and that, in any respect, the trial court's
decision should be affirmed.

In preparing his brief, appellant

carefully searched the record with respect to every challenged
finding and set forth the testimony or evidence that supports
each one. Where no evidence exists, appellant has so indicated.
Some of the challenged findings are supported only by the stale,
badly flawed custody evaluation of Elizabeth Stewart, and
appellant has shown or referred to those portions of the custody
evaluation that support those findings. All of the challenged
findings are so outweighed by competent, current evidence and
testimony that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion
in making them.
The record shows that appellee, a psychiatric nurse
with a long, well-documented history of emotional disorders,
carefully planned and orchestrated this divorce with a continual
pattern of treachery calculated to cast doubt on appellant's
integrity and emotional stability.
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Appellant, by questioning

appellee's veracity and Dr. Stewart's competence at a custodial
interview, alienated himself to Dr. Stewart, with the result
being a carte blanch acceptance by Dr. Stewart of virtually
everything appellee told her.
Sixteen months later, when Dr. Stewart's predictions
were already proving themselves wrong, Dr. Stewart's report was
accepted blindly by the trial court without considering the
evidence presented over six days of testimony.

The result was

that three young children, the oldest of whom appellee threatened
to "make sick," are in the custody of a woman that clearly lacks
the skills, or the desire, to care for them beyond meeting their
basis physical needs, and then only with extraordinary levels of
surrogate care.
ARGUMENT
1.

Appellant has properly marshalled the evidence.

In challenging appellant's marshalling of evidence, appellee
provides "shotgun" citations to the record and then urges the
Court to "compare Susan's cites with Andrew's cites."

A review

of appellee's cites reveals that most have nothing to do with the
findings they supposedly support.

Following his recitation of

each challenged finding, appellant carefully listed the evidence
that would tend to support it.

He then showed that each finding

was contrary to the great weight of the evidence and why the
challenged finding represented an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.

In doing so he has carried his burden of marshalling

the evidence.
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2.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding

custody of the parties1 minor children to appellee.
Appellee relies, like the trial court, on the opinions
and statements contained in Elizabeth Stewart's report to support
the trial court's findings.

Dr. Stewart's report, which resulted

from two brief interviews in the summer of 1993, was seriously
flawed when it was prepared, and it was sixteen months old by the
time of trial.

Even Dr. Stewart admitted that "the issue of

custody should be based on current function."

R. 3133. Because

the Stewart Report served as the basis for many of the Court's
findings, appellant devoted a substantial portion of his brief to
illustrating the deficiencies and errors it contains.

Rather

than reiterating these points, the Court is urged to review
appellant's opening brief, particularly the discussion of the
Stewart Report at pp. 22-31.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has carried his burden in showing that the
trial court utterly failed to consider the best interests of the
parties' three minor children by placing them in the custody of
appellee.

Such a decision was a manifest abuse of judicial

discretion, and it must be reversed.
DATED this ^

day of August 1995.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

K. POLICE^
JAMEE H. WOODALL
Attorney for appellant
BA^BKRA
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